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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of foreign equity and debt on the occurrence of banking crises in 61 
lower-income and middle-income economies during the 1984-2010 period. We also focus on the 
effects of domestic institutions on banking crises and whether they mitigate or exacerbate the 
impact of the external liabilities. We find that FDI liabilities lower the probability of a crisis, while 
debt liabilities increase their incidence. However, institutions that lower financial or political risk 
partially offset the impact of debt liabilities, as does government stability. A decrease in 
investment risk directly reduces the incidence of banking crises.  
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External Liabilities, Domestic Institutions 
and Banking Crises in Developing Economies 
 
1. Introduction 
Banking crises, which were almost non-existent during the Bretton Woods era, became 
more frequent during the subsequent period when the regulation of domestic and foreign financial 
flows and institutions was eased (Bordo et al. 2001). International financial integration can yield 
benefits for an economy that is removing barriers to foreign capital, such as access to more 
sources of finance and a lower cost of capital. But capital flows can also be disruptive and 
contribute to the incidence of financial crises.  
Banks that rely on foreign funds are particularly susceptible to such volatility. Maturity 
transformation can leave these institutions with long-term domestic assets and short-term 
liabilities held by foreigners who withdraw their funds if they fear the outbreak of a crisis. 
Liabilities denominated in foreign currencies add to the fragility of the domestic banks when 
exchange rates are devalued. In their study of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: 155) 
noted that “Periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international 
banking crises, not only famously, as they did in the 1990s, but historically.”  
However, not all forms of foreign capital are likely to lead to banking and other financial 
crises. Debt represents a contractual commitment on which payment is expected regardless of the 
borrower’s circumstances, and debt financing may in some cases be withdrawn on short notice. In 
contrast, the return on equity, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI), depends on the 
profitability of the partner in the host country and is less prone to sudden withdrawals. Moreover, 
the host country firm may be able to draw upon the financial resources of its foreign partner in the 
event of a domestic crisis, which lessens the strain on the local financial system.  
Consequently, some empirical analyses of banking crises have distinguished among the 
different forms of capital. These studies have shown that debt held by foreigners increases the 
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probability of a banking crisis, while equity, and in particular FDI, contributes to a smaller 
occurrence of such crises. Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli (2012), for example, reported that large 
capital inflows driven by debt increase the probability of banking as well as currency and balance-
of-payment crises, while inflows that are driven by FDI or portfolio equity have a negligible 
effect. Powell and Tavella (2015) also found that banking and portfolio debt inflows are linked to 
a higher probability of a bank crisis, but portfolio equity is not.  
Forbes and Warnock (2012) have shown the importance of distinguishing between gross 
inflows and gross outflows. They point out that a change in net flows can be due to the actions of 
foreign or domestic investors, who respond differently to various policies and shocks. An increase 
in net inflows, for example, can be due to an increase in gross inflows by foreign investors or a 
decrease in gross outflows by domestic residents. The proper response to the net flow will depend 
on its source. 
Similarly, changes in the stocks of assets or liabilities can affect the probability of a bank 
crisis. A country may have a neutral position on its external balance position, but its assets—and 
in particular the foreign exchange assets held by a central bank—are not necessarily available to 
the residents who issued foreign-currency denominated liabilities. Therefore, a number of studies 
have looked at the disaggregated stocks of foreign liabilities. Joyce (2011) and Hamdi and Boukef 
Jlassi (2014) found that the stocks of FDI liabilities were associated with fewer bank crises, while 
external debt led to more crises. Ahrend and Goujard (2014) confirmed that increases in debt 
liabilities, particularly short-term debt, increase the occurrence of systemic banking crises.  
Moreover, financial flows take place within a set of institutions. These can include a legal 
code that specifies property rights, a judicial system for adjudicating disputes, and a government 
that protects civil and other liberties. Good institutions are necessary to enforce contracts and 
allow the payout of returns. Those who lend, for example, assume that they will be able to 
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maintain ownership of their investments and receive profits from them, and not suffer theft or 
confiscation.  
Banks link borrowers and lenders, and their ability to maintain these relationships depends 
on the institutional environment in which they operate. Banking crises may be less likely to occur 
if there are good domestic institutions. Klomp (2010) reported that banking crises in emerging 
markets and developing countries were significantly linked to low institutional quality. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) included a measure of law enforcement in their 
pioneering study of the determinants of banking crises. They found that lower values on a “law 
and order” index were associated with the increased likelihood of a crisis. They attributed this 
linkage to a higher probability of fraud and/or a lesser ability to enforce prudential supervision.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache built upon these results in their 2001 study of the impact 
of financial liberalization on banking crises. They used several institutional variables, such as law 
and order and corruption, which they interacted with a financial liberalization measure in order to 
analyze whether the quality of institutions affects the incidence of banking crises following 
financial liberalization. They reported that a stronger institutional environment lowers the 
probability of a banking crisis following the liberalization of financial markets. They inferred from 
this finding that institutional development should be a part of the process of financial 
liberalization. 
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004) in a study of the role of institutions in resolving 
banking crises also investigated their impact on the likelihood of such a crisis. They reported that 
better quality institutions, less corruption and greater judicial efficiency all contributed to a 
decrease in the occurrence of banking crisis. They point to several likely channels, including the 
ability of a well-functioning legal system to restructure corporations in crisis, and the ability of 
supervisory authorities to enforce regulations and intervene in incipient crisis situations. 
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This paper makes two contributions to the literature on banking crises. First, we include in 
our analysis the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities rather than net flows, and distinguish 
among them to determine how debt and the components of equity differ in their impact on the 
incidence of banking crises. Second, we also examine whether domestic institutions affect the 
occurrence of banking crises, and either mitigate or exacerbate the impact of a country’s external 
financial liabilities. Our paper is the first to examine the interaction of domestic institutions with 
external liabilities. 
In our empirical analysis, we investigate the determinants of bank crises in 61 lower-
income and middle-income economies over the years 1984-2010. We concentrate on these 
countries because, as Eichengreen and Rose (2001) pointed out in an early analysis of banking 
crises in these countries, “…their problems are distinctive...” Similarly, Claessens, Klingebiel and 
Laeven (2004) claimed that financial crises are different in emerging markets than those in 
industrial countries, in part because the former have weaker institutions.1 
Our results indicate that the stocks of FDI and debt liabilities have very different impacts 
on bank crises. The former reduce their occurrence, while the latter increase the likelihood of such 
crises. Portfolio equity seems to have little or no effect. In addition, lowering overall financial or 
political risk partially offsets the impact of debt liabilities on the incidence of the crises. 
Institutions that enforce contracts directly reduce the incidence of a crisis. Other political factors, 
such as the stability of the government, can partially offset the impact of debt liabilities.  
The next section of the paper provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 2 
explains the methodology and data used in this study. Section 3 contains the results of the 
analysis. The last section offers our conclusions.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of a panel of 61 developing nations that have experienced banking 
crises and foreign capital volatility. We used the World Bank’s income classification criteria to 
distinguish among the countries.2 They include 27 upper middle-income economies, which are 
often called emerging market economies, and 34 lower middle-income and low-income countries, 
which are the developing economies in our sample. The list of countries appears in the Data 
Appendix in Table A1. The annual time series data covers the period from 1984-2010. This period 
includes several episodes of financial turbulence, including the Gulf War in 1991, the Mexican 
crisis in 1994, the East Asian crisis in 1997-98 and the subsequent Russian crisis, the Argentine 
crisis of 2000-2001 and the global financial crisis of 2008-09. 
Our indicator of a banking crisis is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when there 
was a crisis and zero otherwise. In the empirical analysis, therefore, we used a logit estimation. 
We chose a random effects specification that allows the inclusion of time-invariant determinants.3 
A crisis takes place when y*i,t is positive: 
 
where yi,t is a linear function that is expressed as follows: 
 y!,!∗ =  𝛽FAL!,! +  𝜃X!,! + 𝜀!,!                                                                (2) 
where FALi,t is a measure of foreign assets or liabilities, 
Xi.t is a vector of other explanatory variables 
and 𝜀!,! =  𝜇! + 𝜗!,!  is a composite error term with µi country effects, and 𝜗!,! is the 
independent error term identically distributed with mean zero and variance σ2.  
The dates of the banking crises were obtained from the database of systemic banking crises 
of Laeven and Valencia (2013). The data on external assets and liabilities were taken from the 
Bk Cri,t  = 
1 if yi,t* > 0
0 otherwise
!
"
#
$#
                                                                  (1)
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“External Wealth of Nations” dataset, which was constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).4 
We used several components of the external balance sheet. These include a country’s equity assets 
and its components, FDI and portfolio equity, and also debt assets, each scaled by total foreign 
assets (Eq Ast/Ast, FDI Ast/Ast, Prt Ast/Ast, Dbt Ast/Ast). Similarly, we obtained equity, FDI, 
portfolio equity and debt liabilities, which were scaled by total liabilities (Eq Lbt/Lbt, FDI Lbt/Lbt, 
Prt Lbt/Lbt, Dbt Lbt/Lbt).  
Data on the quality of institutions were obtained from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database. The ICRG ratings are based on 22 variables in three categories: economic risk 
(ECON), financial risk (FIN), and political risk (POL). We also use three components of the 
political risk rating: the country’s investment riskiness profile (INVEST), governmental stability 
(GOV), and democratic accountability (DEM).5 
We drew upon the existing literature for control variables. These consist of macroeconomic 
and financial variables. The macroeconomic variables include the annual growth rate of GDP 
(GDP Gr); real gross domestic product per capita (GDP PC), a measure of economic development; 
inflation (Inf), as measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index; and trade 
openness (Trade), which is measured by the sum of exports plus imports scaled by Gross 
Domestic Product. We have an index of exchange rate regimes (Ex Rte Reg) as rated in the 
Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification scheme. Their system assigns ratings between 1 and 15, 
where higher values are associated with more flexible regimes.6  
The financial variables include the ratio of bank credit to the private sector scaled by GDP 
(DC/GDP), a widely-used indicator of the development of the financial sector; the real interest rate 
(Real Int Rate), as measured by the lending interest rate minus the rate of inflation; and the ratio of 
broad money to the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank (M2/Res), which the IMF (2000) 
interprets as a “measure of the potential impact of a loss of confidence in the domestic currency.”   
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We also have a measure of capital account openness (Cap Open), the de jure index of 
capital controls introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006). This index is based on data reported in the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
regarding the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current and capital account 
transactions, and requirements of export proceeds. Chinn and Ito calculated the first principal 
component of the data reported for each country to construct an index where higher values denote 
fewer regulations and more financial openness.7  
In order to deal with the possibility of reverse causality, all the explanatory variables of the 
model are lagged one year. Duttagupta and Cashin (2011) studied the dynamics of bank crises, and 
found that they follow periods of slower growth and increased credit growth. Examples of other 
studies that have used this methodology include the empirical studies cited in note #1, as well as 
those of Boyd, De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2009), Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang and 
Wihlborg (2010) Angkinand and Willett (2011), and Ahrend and Goujard (2014).  
The definitions and sources of all these variables are listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Summary statistics of the variables are in Table A3 in the Appendix. A matrix of correlation 
coefficients is available from the authors. 
 
3. Results 
Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
 Our initial results appear in Table 1. The results for the lagged control variables are 
consistent with those reported in previous studies. Banking crises are more likely to occur when 
there is slower economic growth, higher inflation, and more private credit preceding the crisis. 
There is some evidence that an increase in trade openness lowers the incidence of crises. The 
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exchange rate regime has a positive coefficient while the capital account openness measure of 
Chinn and Ito has a negative sign, but neither is significant.  
In equation 1 we introduce lagged equity assets scaled by total assets and lagged equity 
liabilities scaled by total liabilities. The assets variable is not significant, but the coefficient of 
equity liabilities is negative and significant at the 1% level. In equation 2, we include only lagged 
FDI assets and liabilities as proportions of total assets and liabilities. The assets variable is not 
significant but FDI liabilities have a negative coefficient that is highly significant. When we 
replace FDI with lagged portfolio equity assets and liabilities in equation 3, neither variable is 
significant. The result for equity liabilities in equation 1, therefore, is driven by the FDI liabilities. 
In the last equation, we include lagged debt assets and liabilities scaled by total assets and 
liabilities, respectively. Debt assets are not significant, but debt liabilities increase the probability 
of the occurrence of a bank crisis and the coefficient is highly significant.  
To ascertain the economic significance of the results, we used the marginal effects of the 
variables evaluated at their mean values.8 A rise in the share of FDI liabilities of all liabilities of 
1% would lower the probability of a bank crisis by approximately .25%, i.e., a quarter of a 
percentage point. The standard deviation of this variable is .173, so a one-deviation rise would 
lower the chances of a bank crisis by 4.3%. However, a rise in the share of debt liabilities of all 
liabilities of 1% would increase the probability of a bank crisis by approximately .14%, while a 
one standard deviation rise of .192 would increase the probability of a debt crisis by 2.8%.  
These results confirm that the composition of the external balance sheet has consequences 
for a country’s vulnerability to banking crises, and are consistent with the earlier studies cited in 
Section 1 above. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) pointed out that banks that borrow from foreign 
lenders are vulnerable to domestic or foreign shocks that increase the burden of continuing 
payments on these liabilities. If the liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency and there is a 
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depreciation of the domestic currency, this burden is heightened. Non-bank borrowers that directly 
borrowed from foreign lenders will also have difficulty in making payments, which can affect 
their obligations to the domestic banks and contributes to a worsening of the conditions of those 
banks. FDI liabilities, in contrast, allow the transfer of risk during downturns, which alleviates 
some of the strain on the domestic financial sector.9 
In Table 2, we again examine the impact of FDI, portfolio equity and debt assets and 
liabilities on the probability of a banking crisis, but include the variables separately. In this 
specification, GDP per capita appears in this table with a negative coefficient that is significant in 
several cases. The results confirm the negative and significant effect of FDI liabilities on the 
incidence of banking crises, and the positive and significant effect of debt liabilities. Moreover, 
when we include debt assets by itself, it appears with a positive and significant coefficient. This 
result may be due to the correlation of debt assets and liabilities. Broner et al. (2013) have shown 
that gross capital flows have been highly correlated, and this linkage may skew our results. The 
correlation coefficient of debt assets and liabilities is 0.49, which is higher than the corresponding 
correlations of FDI assets and liabilities (0.21) or portfolio equity (0.31).  
We extended out benchmark results by reestimating the equations in Table 2 for the upper-
middle income countries, which correspond with many of the emerging market economies, and 
then the lower- and lower-middle income countries. These results are reported in Tables 3 and 4, 
and there are several interesting differences between the two sets of results. We omit the results 
for all equity assets and liabilities to conserve space. 
First, several variables are significant for the upper-middle income countries but not the 
lower- and lower-middle income group. GDP growth, for example, has a highly significant 
negative impact on banking crises for the former group but not the latter. Similarly, inflation is 
significant and positive in several estimations for the upper middle-income countries, but not in 
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the second group. The exchange rate regime has a positive and significant coefficient in several of 
the estimations for the upper middle-income countries, as does the ratio of M2 to reserves. Upper-
middle income economies with lower economic growth, higher inflation rates, more flexible 
exchange rate regimes and larger monetary expansion relative to reserves are more likely to 
experience a banking crisis.  
Second, the capital account openness measure appears with negative and highly significant 
coefficient in the case of the low-income and lower-middle income countries. Opening up the 
capital account in these countries can destabilize an undeveloped financial sector. The upper-
income economies, in contrast, are likely to have more developed financial systems that can 
handle foreign capital flows. 
Third, the coefficients of FDI liabilities and debt liabilities carry negative and positive 
signs, respectively, for both groups of countries. In the case of the upper-income countries, 
however, they are significant at the 1% or 5% levels, while the level of significance for the lower- 
and lower-middle income nations is 10%. Moreover, the coefficient of portfolio assets in the case 
of the upper-income countries is negative and significant, while this coefficient has a positive and 
significant sign in the low-income and lower-income group. Debt assets also have a positive and 
significant coefficient for the upper-income group. Asset holdings play a different role for this 
group, which again may reflect their own more extensive financial markets.      
 
Debt and Institutions 
In this section we examine whether institutions have an effect on banking crises, either 
directly and/or through their interaction with the debt liabilities that raise the probability of such 
events. As explained above, we use several ICRG ratings. We begin with a composite institutional 
rating (INSTIT) based on the three summary ratings of economic risk (ECON), financial risk 
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(FIN) and political risk (POL). We then include each of the three components of overall risk. In 
each case points are awarded based on assessments of a country on various criteria related to the 
type of risk; more points indicate lower risk.  
These results are reported in Table 5. Almost all the control variables appear with their 
usual signs and levels of significance, while the debt liabilities variable has a positive coefficient 
that is highly significant in all the estimations. 
We begin with the composite institutional measure, which appears in equation 1. This 
measure by itself does not affect the incidence of banking crises. However, when it is interacted 
with the debt liabilities measure, its coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level. The 
impact of better institutions offsets in part the effect of debt liabilities.  
We then introduce each of the three main risk component measures in equations 2, 3 and 4. 
None of these ICRG indicators themselves have significant coefficients. However, when financial 
and political risks are interacted with debt liabilities in equations 3 and 4, the interacted variables 
have negative coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. The impact of debt liabilities on the 
incidence of bank crises is lower when there is less political or financial risk. The lack of 
significance of the interaction with the economic measure may reflect the inclusion in the model 
of many of the variables that are also included in the ICRG economic risk measure, including GDP 
growth, GDP per capita, and inflation.  
We examined the marginal effects of the financial and political variables evaluated at their 
mean values to determine if these offsetting effects were economically significant. A rise in the 
share of debt liabilities of all liabilities of 1% would increase the probability of a bank crisis by 
approximately 0.20%. An increase of one unit in the financial risk index, which is measured on a 
scale of 1-50, lowers that increased risk by only 0.012%; since financial risk is measured on scale 
of 1-50, a 1% rise leads to a 0.006% decline in the impact of the debt liabilities variable. A one-
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unit rise in the political risk index, scaled by 1-100, lowers the impact of the debt variable on 
banking crises by 0.009%.  These are relatively small impacts, so a country would have to rise far 
up the respective scales for improvements to have a large effect. However, decreases in financial 
or political risk may affect some of the other variables that have an impact on bank crises. 
To look further at the impact of political risk on the incidence of banking crises, we use 
three of the subcomponents of the political risk rating: investment profile, governmental stability 
and democratic accountability. Again, more points reflect higher ratings and lower risk. The 
results are reported in Table 6.  
Of the three, only one—investment security—has a negative coefficient that is significant 
at the 1% level. The marginal coefficient reveals that a one-unit rise in the index, which is 
measured on a scale of 1-12, lowers the probability of a banking crisis by 0.0183, so the impact of 
a 1% increase in the index lowers the probability by 0.225%. The ICRG guide explains that this 
variable is based on an assessment of several factors: contract viability, the repatriation of profits 
and payments delays. A country that does not rate highly on these criteria is more likely to 
experience unstable business conditions that affect financial institutions and flows, and lead to 
crises. Levine (1998) showed that countries with legal systems that emphasize creditor rights and 
enforce contracts have better-developed banks than countries that do not.  
In addition, the interaction of one of the other subcomponents—government stability—has 
a negative coefficient that is negative and significant at the 5% level. The marginal effect of a 1% 
rise in this index, also measured on a twelve-point scale, is 0.52%, half a percentage point, the 
largest marginal effect of any of the ICRG variables. The democracy variable, by comparison, has 
neither a direct or indirect effect on banking crises. The former result shows that the occurrence of 
bank crises due to debt liabilities is less when a country has a stable and competent government, 
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and this result is not negligible. However, the political system of a country does not affect the 
incidence of bank crises. 
In general, then, the impact of debt liabilities on financial stability may be lessened 
through the establishment of good institutions. Moreover, studies such that of Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coupet and Mayer (2007) have shown that institutional quality is positively linked to FDI.  
Government policies that can improve the institutional environment may have a double payoff: 
equity inflows rise while the impact of debt liabilities during a contraction is lessened.  
Our results are consistent with those of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001),  
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004) and Klomp (2010), cited above. They also looked at 
measures of institutional quality and found that they affected the chances and costs of banking 
crises. They urged the development of better institutions, although they admitted that this process 
takes time. However, some of the aspects of the riskiness of investments could be addressed with 
changes in a country’s legal code.  
How are good institutions acquired? There is no simple organizational framework that is 
applicable in all circumstances. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004: 157) point out that 
“…there is growing evidence that desirable institutional arrangements have a large element of 
context specificity, arising from differences in historical trajectories, geography, political 
economy, or other initial conditions.” They claim that economic principles such as property rights 
and incentives have a common basis, but their institutional embodiment depends on domestic 
conditions. 
 
4. Extensions 
We undertook several extensions of our results.10 First, we interacted the different types of 
liabilities with the Chinn-Ito de jure measure of capital account openness. In these specifications, 
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FDI liabilities again lower the incidence of banking crises as in the previous tables and its 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, its interaction with the capital account variable 
also has a negative coefficient, which is significant at the 5% level. The probability of a crisis with 
FDI liabilities is even lower when there are fewer government restrictions on the capital account. 
The ability of partner firms to reallocate capital may reinforce financial stability and reduce 
fragility. 
In the case of portfolio equity liabilities, the coefficients of both the liability itself and its 
interaction are not significant. In the case of debt, its interaction with the capital account regime is 
not significant, but debt liabilities again has a positive and significant coefficient. Moreover, 
capital account openness itself has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
Deregulation of the capital account, therefore, reinforces the negative effect of FDI liabilities on 
the incidence of banking crises, is neutral with respect to portfolio equity, and may lower the 
incidence of bank crises when there are debt liabilities. 
We then interacted the external balance sheet liabilities with the Reinhart-Rogoff indicator 
of exchange rate regimes, with higher values indicating more flexible systems. The exchange rate 
regime variable itself has positive coefficients, but none are significant and none of the interactive 
variables were significant. The nature of the exchange rate regime, therefore, does not affect the 
impact of external liabilities on bank crises.  
However, exchange rates may matter in a different context. We sought to determine 
whether the existence of a currency crisis had an impact on the effects of the liabilities on banking 
crisis. We introduced a currency crisis dummy variable, which is based on Laeven and Valencia’s 
(2013) chronology, into our estimations. It takes the value of one if a currency crisis occurs either 
before a banking crisis or in the same year.  
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The currency crisis variable itself appears with a positive and significant coefficient 
whenever the interactive term is not included. However, this does not imply causality, as the 
phenomenon of simultaneous or “twin crises” of currency and banking crises occurring is well 
known (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). But none of the interactions of the crisis dummy with the 
external liabilities are significant, and the coefficient of the currency crisis itself is not significant 
in any of these equations. In our sample, currency crises are directly linked to bank crises, as 
previous studies have indicated, but do not change the effect of external liabilities on these crises.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our results illuminate several aspects of banking crises in lower- and middle-income 
countries. As in the advanced economies, the crises follow periods of credit “booms,” as measured 
by the amount of domestic credit extended to the private sector. In the upper-middle income 
countries, they also follow periods of low economic growth and high inflation, and are associated 
with larger monetary sectors.  
Moreover, the composition of the external balance sheet is important. Debt owed to foreign 
lenders can worsen a deteriorating domestic economy and contribute to a banking crisis. FDI, 
however, allows domestic firms to share risks with foreign partners, thus mitigating the impact of 
a domestic shock and lowering the probability of a banking crisis. This effect increases when there 
is liberalization of capital controls.  
Institutions can contribute to lowering the incidence of bank crises. Lower financial and 
political risk can offset to some degree the effect of debt liabilities, as can government stability. 
Moreover, an increase in the security of investments lowers the occurrence of banking crises. A 
stable and efficient government may ease the financial stress that debt owed to foreign lenders can 
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cause. These results reinforce the IMF’s (2002) advice that capital account liberalization be 
undertaken as part of a wider process of institutional reform. 
The issuance of external liabilities, therefore, should be undertaken with several 
considerations in mind. First, banking crises respond to many of the same features—low growth, 
increased credit—in developing economies that occur in advanced countries. Second, equity may 
be more expensive to service than debt, but it has several properties that favor its use. FDI 
contributes to financial stability whereas debt raises the incidence of banking crises. Third, 
financial flows take place in an institutional context, and these institutions also affect the stability 
of the financial environment. Capital account liberalization, therefore, should only be undertaken 
when institutions have been made sufficiently strong to deal with any financial volatility.  
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Data Appendix 
Table A1 
 
Countries 
 
Albania M Ghana L Niger L 
Algeria M Guinea L Nigeria L 
Argentina M Guinea-Bissau L Panama M 
Armenia L Guyana L Paraguay M 
Azerbaijan M Haiti L Peru M 
Bangladesh L Indonesia L Philippines L 
Belarus M Jamaica M Romania M 
Bolivia L Jordan M Russia M 
Brazil M Kenya L Senegal L 
Bulgaria M Latvia M Sri Lanka L 
Burkina Faso L Lebanon M Tanzania L 
Cameroon L Liberia L Thailand M 
Chile M Lithuania M Togo L 
China M Madagascar L Tunisia M 
Colombia M Malaysia M Uganda L 
Congo, Republic of L Mali L Ukraine L 
Dominican Republic M Mexico M Venezuela M 
Ecuador M Morocco L Vietnam L 
Egypt L Mozambique L Yemen L 
El Salvador L Nicaragua L Zambia L 
    Zimbabwe L 
 
 
 
Note: L: Lower-Income and Lower Middle-Income. M: Upper Middle-Income 
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Table A2 
 
Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variables Definitions Source 
Cap Open Capital account openness Chinn and Ito (2006)  
DC/GDP Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) WDI 
Debt Ast/Ast, 
Debt Lbt/ Lbt 
Debt Assets/Assets, 
Debt Liabilities /Liabilities EWN 
DEM Democracy (higher numbers less risk) ICRG 
ECON Economic Risk (higher numbers less risk) ICRG 
Eq Ast/Ast, 
Eq Lbt/Lbt 
Equity Assets/Assets, 
Equity Liabilities/Liabilities EWN 
Ex Rte Reg Exchange Rate Regime (higher numbers more flexible) Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
FDI Ast/Ast, 
FDI Lbt/ Lbt 
FDI Assets/Assets 
FDI Liabilities /Liabilities EWN 
FIN Financial Risk(higher numbers indicate less risk) ICRG 
GDP Gr GDP growth (%) WDI 
GDP PC GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) WDI 
GOV Government Stability (higher numbers indicate less risk) ICRG 
Inf Change in Consumer Price Index (%)  WDI 
INSTIT Composite of economic, financial and political risk (higher numbers less risk) ICRG 
INVEST Investment Risk (higher numbers less risk) ICRG 
M2/Res Money and quasi money /Total reserves (%)  WDI 
POL Political Risk (higher numbers less risk) ICRG 
Prt Eq Ast/Ast, 
Prt Eq Lbt/Lbt 
Portfolio Equity Assets/Assets, 
Portfolio Equity Liabilities/Liabilities EWN 
Real Int Rate Nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation  WDI 
Trade Exports plus imports/GDP (%) WDI 
 
Notes: EWN = External Wealth of Nations; ICRG = International Country Risk Guide; WDI = 
World Development Indicators 
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Table A3 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DC/GDP 1520 29.772 27.134 0.198 165.719 
Debt Ast/Ast 1671 0.565 0.204 0.038 1.1483 
Debt  Lbt/Lbt 1673 0.730 0.192 0.086 1.000 
DEM 1523 3.313 1.372 0.000 6.000 
ECON 1519 30.480 6.780 1.500 45.166 
Eq Ast/Ast      
Eq Lbt/Lbt      
Ex Rate Reg 1591 8.048 4.422 1.000 15.000 
FDI Ast/Ast 1671 0.055 0.082 0.010 0.499 
FDI Lbt/Lbt 1673 0.241 0.173 0.000 0.499 
FIN 1519 30.312 8.138 6.333 49.166 
Fin Lib      
GDP Gr 1660 3.289 6.828 -51.030 106.279 
GDP PC 1687 6.946 1.078 4.171 9.646 
GOV 1561 7.332 2.314 1.000 12.000 
Inf 1656 3.177 1.051 -1.736 10.195 
INSTIT 1519 59.030 11.389 13.500 82.466 
INVEST 1523 6.417 2.137 0.000 11.500 
M2/Res  1552 11.977 101.907 -37.292 3691.140 
POL 1519 57.230 11.520 10.000 81.833 
Prt Eq Ast/Ast 1649 0.014 0.036 0.000 0.399 
Prt Eq Lbt/Lbt  1663 0.027 0.058 0.000 0.462 
Real Int Rate 1174 7.445 20.883 -97.812 252.115 
Trade 1584 68.754 36.888 11.544 280.361 
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NOTES 
 
1 Other studies of banking crises in emerging markets and developing economies include those of 
 
1 Other studies of banking crises in emerging markets and developing economies include those of 
Chang and Velasco (2001), Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), Noy (2004), Daniel and Jones (2007), 
Duttagupta and Cashin (2010), Joyce (2011) and Hamdi and Boukef Jlassi (2014). 
2 An explanation of the World Bank’s classification criteria is provided at: 
 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-
lending-groups 
 
3 Boyd, De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2009) also used random effect models in their study of 
banking crises. 
4 The dataset is available at: http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html 
5 More information on the construction of the ratings is available in the International Country Risk 
Methodology: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf 
6 The data can be found at: http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/ 
7 The data are available at: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
8 The results with the marginal effects of the variables are available from the authors. 
9 Alfaro and Chen (2012) found that multinational subsidiaries fared better than domestic firms 
during the global financial crisis, and attributed the difference in part to financial linkages with the 
parent firm. 
10 All results are available from authors. 
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Table 1  
 
Banking Crises and Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
 Variables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
GDP Gr -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.071*** 
  (0.021) (0.0213) (0.021) (0.021) 
GDP PC -0.096 -0.172 -0.366 -0.128 
  (0.213) (0.214) (0.243) (0.230) 
Inf 0.369** 0.314* 0.431** 0.288* 
  (0.171) (0.164) (0.177) (0.167) 
DC/GDP 0.031*** 0.0310*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Ex Rte Reg 0.024 0.027 0.052 0.038 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Real Int Rate 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2/Res 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.003 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Trade -0.009* -0.008 -0.0123** -0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cap Open -0.116 -0.091 -0.160 -0.121 
  (0.114) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) 
Eq Ast/Ast 2.324       
  (1.618)       
Eq Lbt/Lbt -3.661***       
  (1.114)       
FDI Ast/Ast   2.830     
    (1.824)     
FDI Lbt/Lbt   -4.107***     
    (1.240)     
Prt Ast/Ast     -6.747   
      (6.389)   
Prt Lbt/Lbt      -0.369   
      (3.108)   
Dbt Ast/Ast       1.307 
        (0.882) 
Dbt  Lbt/Lbt       2.407** 
        (1.129) 
Constant -2.377 -1.830 -1.633 -5.624*** 
  (1.447) (1.458) (1.690) (2.161) 
Observations 1,026 1,042 1,026 1,042 
Pseudo R2  0.499  0.497  0.496  0.497 
Log Likelihood -331.2 -332.6 -335.7 -333.4 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, the 
exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, FDI 
assets/assets, FDI liabilities/liabilities, portfolio equity assets/assets, portfolio liabilities/liabilities, debt 
assets/assets and debt liabilities/liabilities. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** 
and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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Table 2 
 
Banking Crises and Foreign Assets and Liabilities:  
Alternative Specification 
 
Variables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 
GDP Gr -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.076*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
GDP PC -0.503** -0.097 -0.527** -0.149 -0.398* -0.460* -0.378* -0.124 
  (0.229) (0.226) (0.226) (0.222) (0.229) (0.241) (0.217) (0.232) 
Inf 0.368** 0.382** 0.378** 0.312* 0.372** 0.434** 0.312* 0.315* 
  (0.169) (0.174) (0.170)  (0.166) (0.170)  (0.178) (0.170)  (0.166) 
DC/GDP 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ex Rte Reg 0.056 .034 0.056 0.035 0.056 0.054 0.050 .040 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Real Int Rate 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 .003 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2/Res 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.006 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Trade -0.012** -0.009* 0.012** -0.008 -0.012** -0.012** -0.011* -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (-0.006) 
Cap Open -0.164 -0.126 -0.155 -0.116 -0.161 -0.162 -0.148 -0.127 
  (0.122) (0.117) (0.122) (0.120)  (0.122) (-0.121) (0.121) (0.119) 
Eq Ast/Ast 0.316               
  (1.65)                
Eq Lbt/Lbt  -3.003***             
   (1.057)             
FDI Ast/Ast   1.205           
    (1.864)           
FDI Lbt/Lbt    -3.620***         
     (1.208)         
Prt Ast/Ast     -7.286       
      (6.687)       
Prt Lbt/Lbt       -0.435     
       (3.18)      
Dbt Ast/Ast       1.938**   
        (0.856)   
Dbt  Lbt/Lbt        2.956*** 
         (1.071) 
Constant -0.781 -2.638* -0.708 -2.103 -1.382 -1.183 -2.604 -5.387** 
  (1.613) (1.526) (1.600)  (1.507) (1.612) (1.691) (1.73)  (2.154) 
Observations 1,030 1,038 1,042 1,042 1,030 1,038 1,042 1,042 
Pseudo R2 0,490  0 .496 0.489   0.495  0.491 0.490  0.493  0.494  
Log Likelihood -337.4 -333.2 -338 -333.7 -336.7 -337.1 -335.6 -334.5 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, the 
exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, FDI 
assets/assets, FDI liabilities/liabilities, portfolio equity assets/assets, portfolio liabilities/liabilities, debt 
assets/assets and debt liabilities/liabilities. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** 
and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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Table 3 
 
Banking Crises and Foreign Assets and Liabilities: 
Upper-Income Countries 
 
 Variables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 
GDP Gr -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) 
GDP PC 0.071 0.516 0.460 0.0390 0.301 0.553 
  (0.385) (0.359) (0.358) (0.368) (0.319) (0.375) 
Inf 0.647** 0.411 0.646** 0.999*** 0.384 0.439 
  (0.291) (0.296) (0.289) (0.346) (0.278) (0.293) 
DC/GDP 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ex Rte Reg 0.0969* 0.075 0.114** 0.0811 0.0994** 0.083* 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.0495) 
Real Int Rate 0.0136 0.010 0.0100 0.00709 0.013 0.0101 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
M2/Res 0.105** 0.091** 0.098** 0.086** 0.063 0.0903** 
  (0.044) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) 
Trade -0.001 -0.009 -0.014** -0.011* -0.011* -0.009 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cap Open  0.197 0.132 0.225 0.220 0.0977 0.125 
  (0.175) (0.179) (0.174) (0.171) (0.171) (0.177) 
FDI Ast/Ast  -1.880           
  (2.478)           
FDI Lbt/ Lbt   -4.130***         
    (1.56)         
Prt Ast/Ast     -27.00**     
      (12.07)     
Prt Lbt/Lbt       -0.854   
        (3.203)   
Dbt Ast/Ast       3.214***   
        (1.125)   
Dbt Lbt/Lbt          3.196** 
          (1.282) 
Constant -6.585** -7.847*** -8.892*** -7.006** -9.144*** -11.68*** 
  (3.281) (2.865) (3.119) (3.196) (3.024) (3.626) 
Observations 488 488 488 484 488 488 
Pseudo R2 0.788 0.792 0.796 0.791 0.793 0.792 
Log Likelihood -140.4 -137.3 -135.2 -138.3 -137.2 -137.9 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, 
the exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, 
FDI assets/assets, FDI liabilities/liabilities, portfolio equity assets/assets, portfolio liabilities/liabilities, 
debt assets/assets and debt liabilities/liabilities. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, 
** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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Table 4 
 
Banking Crises and Foreign Assets and Liabilities: 
Lower- and Lower-Middle Income Countries 
 
 Variables 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 
GDP Gr -0.040  -0.039 -0.039 -0.038 -0.035 -0.039 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
GDP PC -0.749* -0.431 -0.977** -0.781* -0.705 -0.393 
  (0.414) (0.453) (0.443) (0.468) (0.430)  (0.468) 
Inf 0.139 0.098 0.063 0.12  0.112 0.101 
  (0.228) (0.227) (0.231) (0.229) (0.230)  (0.227) 
DC/GDP 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ex Rte Reg 0.062 0.065 0.084 0.069 0.068 0.067 
  (0.063) (0.063) -0.065 (0.064) -0.064 -0.063 
Real Int Rate 0.001 0.003 07.34e-05  0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
M2/Res 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Trade -0.015 -0.007 -0.0183* -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Cap Open  -0.562*** -0.495** -0.594*** -0.578*** -0.561*** -0.507** 
  (0.198) (0.202) (0.201) (0.201) (0.203) (0.202) 
FDI Ast/Ast  3.376           
  (2.866)           
FDI Lbt/ Lbt   -3.884*         
    (2.155)         
Prt Ast/Ast     23.14**     
      (11.17)      
Prt Lbt/Lbt       0.813   
        (6.542)   
Dbt Ast/Ast       0.67    
        (1.213)   
Dbt Lbt/Lbt          3.303* 
          (1.989) 
Constant 0.828 -0.716 2.457 0.948 0.027 -4.366 
  (2.65)  (2.860)  (2.82)  (3.024) (3.063) (4.093) 
Observations 554 554 542 554 554 554 
Pseudo R2 0.719 0.720 0.722 0.718 0.718 0.720 
Log Likelihood -186.1 -185.1 -184.1 -186.8 -186.7 -185.4 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, 
the exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, 
FDI assets/assets, FDI liabilities/liabilities, portfolio equity assets/assets, portfolio liabilities/liabilities, 
debt assets/assets and debt liabilities/liabilities. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, 
** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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Table 5 
 
Banking Crises, Foreign Assets and Liabilities and Risk 
 
 Variables 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
GDP Gr -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.068*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
GDP PC -.063 -.116 -.021 -.070  
  (0.256) -(0.245) (0.247) (0.249) 
Inf 0.316* 0.373** 0.324* 0.334** 
  (0.170)  (0.173) (0.167) -(0.170)  
DC/GDP 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ex Rte Reg 0.040  0.045 0.0370 0.040  
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
Real Int Rate (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2/Res 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Trade -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006 (0.006) (0.006) 
Cap Open -0.087 -0.137 -0.060  -0.127 
  (0.124) -(0.124) (0.122) (0.124) 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt 3.714*** 3.002** 3.465*** 3.542*** 
  (1.246) (1.187) (1.286) (1.159) 
INSTIT -0.006       
  (-0.020)        
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X INSTIT -0.147*       
  (0.083)       
ECON   0.012     
    (0.031)     
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X ECON   0.037     
    (0.143)     
FIN     -0.028   
      (0.025)   
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X FIN     -0.210**   
      (0.103)   
POL        -0.0003 
        (0.017) 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X POL       -0.159** 
        (0.078) 
Constant -4.044** -3.554** -4.352** -4.016** 
  -1.846 -1.747 -1.789 -1.837 
Observations 1030 1030 1030 1030 
Pseudo R2 0.505 0.501 0.508 0.505 
Log Likelihood -327.7 -329.9 -325.8 -327.5 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, 
the exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, 
debt liabilities/liabilities, institutional risk, economic risk, financial risk and political risk. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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Table 6 
 
Banking Crises, Foreign Assets and Liabilities and Components of Political Risk 
 
 Variables 6.1 6.2 6.3 
GDP Gr -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
GDP PC 0.031 -0.057 0.006 
  (0.245) (0.240)  (0.248) 
Inf 0.283* 0.305* 0.340** 
  (0.168) (0.168) -0.167 
DC/GDP 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
  (0.009) -0.008 -0.008 
Ex Rte Reg 0.044 0.043 0.047 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Real Int Rate 0.002 0.006 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2/Res 0.003 0.006 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Trade -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cap Open -0.005 -0.062 -0.124 
  (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt 1.768 2.830** 3.349*** 
  (1.141) (1.159) (1.107) 
INVEST -0.336***     
  (0.081)     
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X INVEST -0.230      
  (0.395)     
GOV   -0.101   
    (0.067)   
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X GOV   -0.723**   
    (0.357)   
DEM     -0.153 
    (0.128) 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt X DEM   -0.876 
    (0.638) 
Constant  -4.076** -4.449** 
   (1.753) (1.818) 
Observations 1030 1030 1030 
Pseudo R2 0.516 0.508 0.504 
Log Likelihood -320.4 -325.7 -328.3 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for banking crises. The lagged independent variables are the 
growth rate of real GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, domestic credit extended to the private sector/GDP, 
the exchange rate regime, the real interest rate, M2/Reserves, trade openness, capital account openness, 
debt liabilities/liabilities, investment risk, government stability and democratic accountability. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 
1%.  
 
 
